Buffer Overflow in an API Call |
Attack Pattern ID: 8 (Detailed Attack Pattern Completeness: Complete) | Typical Severity: High | Status: Draft |
Summary
This attack targets libraries or shared code modules which are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. An attacker who has access to an API may try to embed malicious code in the API function call and exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability in the function's implementation. All clients that make use of the code library thus become vulnerable by association. This has a very broad effect on security across a system, usually affecting more than one software process.
Attack Execution Flow
An attacker can call an API exposed by the target host.
On the probing stage, the attacker injects malicious code using the API call and observes the results. The attacker's goal is to uncover a buffer overflow vulnerability.
The attacker finds a buffer overflow vulnerability, crafts malicious code and injects it through an API call. The attacker can at worst execute remote code on the target host.
The target host exposes an API to the user.
One or more API functions exposed by the target host has a buffer overflow vulnerability.
Description
A buffer overflow in the FreeBSD utility setlocale (found in the libc module) puts many programs at risk all at once.
Description
A buffer overflow in the Xt library of the X windowing system allows local users to execute commands with root privileges.
Skill or Knowledge Level: Low
An attacker can simply overflow a buffer by inserting a long string into an attacker-modifiable injection vector. The result can be a DoS.
High : Exploiting a buffer overflow to inject malicious code into the stack of a software system or even the heap can require a higher skill level.
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Use secure functions not vulnerable to buffer overflow.
If you have to use dangerous functions, make sure that you do boundary checking.
Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.
Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
- Denial of Service
- Run Arbitrary Code
- Information Leakage
- Data Modification
When the function returns control to the main program, it jumps to the return address portion of the stack frame. Unfortunately that return address may have been overwritten by the overflowed buffer and the address may contain a call to a privileged command or to a malicious code.
CWE-ID | Weakness Name | Weakness Relationship Type |
---|---|---|
120 | Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow') | Targeted |
119 | Failure to Constrain Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | Targeted |
118 | Improper Access of Indexable Resource ('Range Error') | Targeted |
74 | Failure to Sanitize Data into a Different Plane ('Injection') | Targeted |
20 | Improper Input Validation | Targeted |
680 | Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow | Targeted |
733 | Compiler Optimization Removal or Modification of Security-critical Code | Secondary |
697 | Insufficient Comparison | Targeted |
Nature | Type | ID | Name | Description | View(s) this relationship pertains to |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ChildOf | Attack Pattern | 100 | Overflow Buffers | Mechanism of Attack (primary)1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 14 | Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow | Mechanism of Attack1000 | |
PeerOf | Attack Pattern | 46 | Overflow Variables and Tags | Mechanism of Attack1000 | |
ParentOf | Attack Pattern | 69 | Target Programs with Elevated Privileges | Mechanism of Attack1000 |
CWE - Buffer Errors
Submissions | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Submitter | Organization | Date | ||
G. Hoglund and G. McGraw. Exploiting Software: How to Break Code. Addison-Wesley, February 2004. | Cigital, Inc | 2007-03-01 |
Modifications | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Modifier | Organization | Date | Comments | ||
Eric Dalci | Cigital, Inc | 2007-02-13 | Fleshed out content to CAPEC schema from the original descriptions in "Exploiting Software" | ||
Sean Barnum | Cigital, Inc | 2007-03-05 | Review and revise | ||
Richard Struse | VOXEM, Inc | 2007-03-26 | Review and feedback leading to changes in Description | ||
Sean Barnum | Cigital, Inc | 2007-04-13 | Modified pattern content according to review and feedback |